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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

The Fred T. Koremntsu Center for Lnw nnd Equnlity ("Koremntsu
Center"), based nt Senttle University School of Law, adVImcesjustice
through resenrch, advocncy, nnd educntion. Cl]rrently, the Korenmtsu
Center is leading n statewide effort to understnnd the racinl
disproportionality thnt exists within our criminal justice system. 1 Effective
life sentences like this one are especially devastnting for youth of color
who nre much more likely thnn white youth offenders to receive such
sentences. 2 The Korematsu Center does not, in this brief or otherwise,
represent the officinl views of Seattle University.
The Latina/o Bnr Associntion ofWnshington and the Loren Miller
Bar Associntion nre nssociations of attorneys committed to represent and
ndvnnce the interests of the Latina/o nncl African-American communities.
LBA W and LMBA are nctive participants in the legal community,
advocating for solutions to the problems confronting our legal system.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In Graham v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court held that sentencing
juveniles to life without parole for non-homicide offenses constitutes cruel

1

Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System, PrelimillmJ' Report 011 Race and
Washington's Crimina/Justice System (20 I I).
2
Human Rights Watch, 111e Rest of their Lives: L{(e Without Parole for Youth Offenders
in the United States in 2008, at *39 (2008).

1

nnd unusunl punishment. 560 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 20 II, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825
(20 I 0). The Graham Court rensoned tlmt youth nre less culpnble thnn
ndults becnuse of biologicnl differences in brnin development tlmt render
youth more immnture, more likely to engnge in risky behnvior, nnd more
vulnernble to externnl influences like peer pressure. Id. nt 2040.
Additionnlly, becnusc youth brnins nre still developing well into lnte
ndolescence, the Court determined thnt their personnlity trnits nre more
trnnsient and capable of chnnge thnn ndult personnlities.Id. at 2026-27.
The undisputed scientific dnta confirms that youth cnnnot be expected to
act as mnture adults.
Although the Graham Court concluded that youth offenders must
be given a "menningful opportunity to obtain release," it left it to the
States, "in the tirst instance" to define whnt a meaningful opportunity
would be and when it must occur. !d. at 2030. That instance has arrived:
Guadalupe Solis Diaz, a youth convicted of n non-homicide offense
committed when he wns 16 years old, received an effective life sentence
of92.5 years. Because Washington has nbolished its parole system, this
sentence gives Guadalupe no meaningful opportunity to obtain release.
This case is a prime exmnple of how a youth offender's biological
immaturities and susceptibility to peer pressure may facilitate poor
decision mnking both in committing a crime nnd during plen-bnrgnining.

2

Given Gmham's reasoning and what we know scientifically about
youth brain development, this Court should vacate Guadalupe's sentence.
The Court also should use this opportunity to provide guidance to the
lower courts by defining "meaningful opportunity" as a term of years no
longer than the youth's age at the times/he committed the underlying
offense. In this way, a 16-year-old offender will have the opportunity-

though not/he guamnlee- to be released by the age of32, if that youth
has "demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." !d. at 2030. An age-based
proportional delinition of"meaningful opportunity" would be consistent
with the Graham Court's reasoning that because youth offenders are less
culpable than their adult counterparts, we should not give up on them no
matter how heinous their crimes may have been. !d. at 2032-33.

ARGUMENT

I.

Medical Research on Brain Development Confirms that Youth
Offenders Undet· 18 Years of Age Are Categorically Different
from Adult Offenders with Regard to Culpability,
Susceptibility to Detenence, Vulnerability to Peer l't·essure,
and Capacity for Change.
A youth's mind is different. Parents know it. Lawmakers know it?

And the U.S. Supreme Court knows it. In Roper and Gmham, the Court

3

In fact, state law explicitly acknowledges differences between a youth brain and an
adult brain: "The legislature finds that emerging research on brain development indicates
that adolescent brains, and thus adolescent intellectual and emotional capabilities, differ
significantly from those of mature adults. It is appropriate to take these diffet:ences into

3

recognized that a youth's culpability "is diminished, to a substantial
degree" based on biological differences between a youth's brain and an
adult's brain. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161
L. Ed. 2d I (2005) (emphasis added). These biological distinctions have
long been recognized by common-sense and ratified by our society's laws
which "recognize[] a host of distinctions between the rights and duties of
children and those of adults." New Jersey v. TL. 0., 469 U.S. 325, 350 n.2,
105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring). 4
These judicially and legislatively recognized distinctions are based
on t!Hee categorical differences that separate youth from adults: (I) a
propensity to engage in risky behavior; (2) a susceptibility to external
consideration when sentencing juveniles tried as adults. The legislature fi1rther finds that

applying mandatory minimum sentences for juveniles tried as adults prevents trial comt
judges tl-om taking these differences into consideration in appropriate circumstances.)!
RCW 9.94A.540, Findings-- Intent-- 2005 c 437( 1).
4

For instance, \Vashington State has enacted numerous protective laws to keep youth
from purchasing, using, or possessing certain substances or items. See, e.g., RC\V

66.44.290( I) (prohibiting persons under twenty-one years of age from purchasing or
consuming alcohol); RCW 70.155.080(1) (prohibiting minors fi·om purchasing,
possessing, or attempting to obtain tobacco products); RCW 9.41.020(2)(iii) (prohibiting

minors fi·om owning or possessing a firearm, except as provided by RCW 9.41.042).
Further, the state has categoricnlly barred minors fi:om playing in authorized gambling
activities, RCW 9.46.228, voting in any election authorized by the Constitution and
otherwise qualified by law, RCW 26.28.0 15(3), or making certain decisions regarding
their own body or the body of their lawful issue, such as consenting to surgery, RCW
26.28.0 10(5). Similarly, minors may not enter nor be bound by a contract, RCW
26.28.015(4), RCW 26.28.030), sue or be sued in any court of the state without a
guardian ad litem, RCW 26.28.0 1(6), many without parental consent, RCW
26.28.0 10(1 ), or even mark their bodies with a tattoo, RCW 26.28.085.

Federal law also recognizes youth incompetency in certain 11ctivities. Under I0
U.S.C. § 505(a), a person must be eighteen to serve in the militmy without paretttal

consent. Federal law also prohibits, with certain exceptions, persons under the age of
eighteen fi·om possessing a handgun or handgun ammunition. 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2), (5).

4

pressures; and (3) a transient personality with a penchant for change.

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028-33. "The susceptibility of juveniles to
immature and irresponsible behavior means 'their irresponsible conduct is
not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult."' Roper, 543 U.S. at 570
(citation omitted). Science can now verify what society's laws and
common sense have always known to be true: because youth minds are
different, youth offenders must be treated differently than adult ofTenders. 5

A. Because Youth Brains Arc Structumlly Hardwired in Ways
that Promote Risky and Impulsive Behavior, Adult
Sanctions Do Not Deter Youth Misconduct.
The notion that youth, as a group, are prone to impulsive behavior
is not simply a stereotype. Indeed, various studies have confirmed that
youth "exhibit a disproportionate amount of reckless behavior, sensation
6

seeking and risk taking." In fact, across cultures, developmental
psychiatrists have found that reckless and sensation seeking behavior

peaks during adolescence. 7 In particular, violent crimes "peak sharply" in
8

late adolescence (ages 16 and 17). This behavior often involves criminal

5

Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason qfAdolescence:
Developmental Immaturi~v. Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty,
58 AM. PSVCHOL. 1009, 1011-13 (2003).
6
Linda Patia Spear, The Adolescent Brain aiUI Age-Related Behm•iorall!Ianffestations,
24 NEUROSC!. & BIOBEIIAV. REVS. 417, 421 n.l (2000).
7
Beatrice Luna, The 1Haturation C?fCognitive Control and the Adolescent Brain, in FROt-.·1
ATTENTION TO GOAL-DIRECTED BEIIAVIOR 250 (Aboitiz & Cosmelli, eds.) (2009).
8
Terrie Moffit, Adolescent-Limited and Lffe-Course-Persistent Antisocial ?Behm'ior: A
Developmental Taxonomy, 100 Psycho!. Rev. 674,685-86 (1993).

5

activities such as drunk driving and drug use, and reckless conduct such as
9

unprotected sex. This is due, in part, because youth overvalue rewards
and minimize risks, thereby skewing their cost calculus when making

..

(IeCISIOilS.

10

Recent brain imaging studies have found a biological link between
risk taking behavior and pre-frontal brain development.'' In particular,
youth brains show increased neural activity in parts of the brain linked to
risky behavior,

12

and less activity in the prefrontal cortex, which continues

to mature through late adolescence. 13 Prefrontal cortex maturation is
especially important when gauging youth culpability because that part of
the brain is associated with decision making generally, 14 including making
moral judgments, 15 and evaluating future consequences.'" Moreover, the

9

"[T]n laboratory experiments and studies across a wide range of adolescent populations,
developmental psychologists [have shown] that adolescents are risk takers who inflate the
benefits of crime and sharply discount its consequences, even when they know the law."
Jeffi·ey Pagan, fVIw Science and Development AIafter in Juwnile Justice, TilE AlvlERICAN
PROSPECT, Aug. 14, 2005, at 2.
10
Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 16:3 ANN. REV.
CLINICAL PSYCHO!"' 47, 57 (2009) Q1ereinafter "Steinberg 2009"].
11
James Bjork et al., Developmental Differences in Posterior Afesofrontal Cortex
Recruitment by Risky Rm1•ard,, 27 J. OF NEUROSCI. 4839 (2007).
12
Robert Shepherd, The Relevance of Brain Research to Juvenile Justice, 19 CRIM. JUST.
51, 52 (2005) ("[T]here are clear neurological explanations for the difficulties adolescents
have in cognitive functioning, in exercising mature judgment, in controlling impulses, in
weighing the consequences of actions, in resisting the influence of peers, and in generally
becoming more responsible.").
13
Casey, B. J. et al., The Adolescent Brain, 28 Developmental Rev. 62, 68 (2008).
14
Samantha B. \\1right et al., Neural Correlates qf Fluid Reasoning in Children and
Adults, I :8 Frontiers Human Neurosci. 7 (2008) (prefi·ontal cortex controls reasoning).
15
Jorge Mollet al., Frontopolar and Anterior Temporal Cortex Activation in a 1\loral
Judgment Task: Preliminm)' Functional MRI Results in Normal Subjects, 59 ARQ
NEURO-PSQUIATR 657 (2001).

6

ability to regulate one's emotions- a crucial element of behavior control 17
-does not fully develop until post-adolescence. 18
As a result, youth brains develop with a s/ruc/uml imbalance that
effectively promotes poor decision making: the areas that motivate
reckless behavior mature sooner than the areas that regulate such
behavior.

19

Put simply, the youth brain is literally hard-wired to promote

poor decision making. Because youth brains are biologically less
"capable" ofregulating their behavior, 20 "[i]t is statistically aberrant to
refrain from such [risk-taking] behavior during adolescence." 21
Additionally, experience demonstrates and the scientific research
confirms that long sentences such as this one do nothing to deter youth
offenders because their limited life experiences make it difficult for them
to weigh consequences and perceive long stretches oftime. 22 Indeed,

16

Antoine 13echera et a!., Characterization of the Decision-Making Deficit of f'atients
with Vellfromedial f'r~fi'ontal Cortex Lesions, 123 BRAIN 2189, 2189-99 (2000).
17
Sang lice Kim & Stephan Hamann, Neural Correlates C?.f Positive and Negative
Emotion Regulation, 19:5 J. COGNITIVE NF.UROSCI. 776, 776 (2007).
18
Casey, supra note 13, at 65.
19
Steinberg 2009, supra note 10, at 54.
20
Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (lm)Maturity of.ludgmellf in Adolescences:
TVI(J' Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults, t8 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741, 742
(2000).
21
Spear, supra note 6. See also Jeffi·ey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A
Developmental f'erspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339,344 (1992) (noting that over
half of youth reported driving drunk, using drugs, engaging in other criminal acts).
22

"Few adolescents are likely to be able to grasp the true significance of a life sentence.
One twenty-nine-year-old woman serving li fc without parole told a researcher for this
report that when she was sentenced, at the age of sixteen: 'I didn't understand "life
without" ... [that] to have "life without," you were locked down forever. You know it
really dawned on me when [after several years in prison, a journalist] came and ... he

7

"Roper noted that 'the same characteristics that render juveniles less
culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible
to deterrence." Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at
571). 23 In one study, researchers found that the threat of adult sanctions
had no deterrent effect whatsoever on youth crime.

24

In sum, there is a strong biological basis for the notion that youth
offenders are less culpable than their adult counterparts.

n.

Youth Arc l'articularly Vulnerable to External Pressures at
Home and to Pect· Pressures.

Another reason youth are less culpable than adults is because they
are uniquely susceptible to negative external influences and peer pressure.
First, youth are not old enough to control or remove themselves from
negative environments, which can undermine decision making. In
particular, youth are completely "dependent on living circumstances of
their parents and families and hence are vulnerable to the impact of

asked me, "Do you realize that you're gonna be in prison for the rest of your life?" And I
said, "Do you really think that?, You know ... and I was like, "For the rest of my life?
Do you think tlwt God will leave me in prison for the rest of my life?'" Human Rights
\Vatch, ''The Rest of Their Lives/' supra note 2, at 4-5.
23
"Because juveniles' 'lack of maturity and under-developed sense of responsibility ...
often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions," Johnsonv. Texas, 509
U.S. 350,367, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993), they are less likely to take a
possible punishment into consideration when making decisions. This is particularly so
when that punishment is rarely imposed." Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028-29.
24
Eric L. Jensen & Linda Metsger, A Test of the Deterrent Effect <!(Legislative Waiver
on Violence Juvenile Crime, 40 CRIME & DELINQ. 96, I00-02 ( 1994).

8

conditions well beyond their control." 25 Put differently, youth are not old
enough to "extricate themselves from a criminogenic setting." Roper, 543
U.S. at 569; see also id. (noting that "juveniles have a greater claim than
adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their
whole environment").
Second, youth brains are more sensitive to certain emotional
triggers, such as fear, rejection, and the desire to "fit in," making them
particularly vulnerable to peer pressures. 26 In fact, the parts of the brain
associated with resistance to peer influence are still developing well into
late adolescence. 21 One study found that peer pressure doubles risky
behavior, including criminal behavior, among youth. 28 Peer pressure can
be especially pronounced in the gang context, where the data indicate
enormous group pressure exists to engage in self destructive behavior. 29
Indeed, it is no coincidence that most youth crime is group youth crime. 30

25

Alan E. Kazdin, Adolescent Development, Aieutal Disorders, and Decision making qf
Delinquent Youths, in YoUTH ON TRIAL 33 (Grisso & Schwartz, e<ls., 2000).
26
Laurence Steinberg & Kathryn C. Monahan, Age D{fferences in Resistance to Peer
Pressure, 43 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1531, 1536-38 (2007).
27
Steinberg 2009, supra note I 0, at 56.
28
Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer li[f/ueuce 011 Risk Taking. Risk Pr~(ereuce,
and RisAy Decision Making in Adolescence ami Adulthood: Au Experimelllal Stu<(!', 41
Developmental Psycho!. 625, 626-34 (2005).
29
See Michele Mouttapa, et al., I'm Mad and I'm Bad: Links Between Se((-ldeut{{icatiou
as a GangsteJ~ Symptoms qfAnger, and Alcohol Use Among A1inority Juvenile Qlfenders,
8 Youth Violence & Juvenile Justice 71 (2010) (finding that identifying with a "gang
member peer group" increases the likelihood of destructive behavior such as heavy
alcohol use).
Frank in Zimring, Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender, in YOUTH ON TRIAL
281 (2000) ("No matter the crime, if a teenager is the offender, he is usually not

°

3

9

Together, these two vulnerabilities- an inability to control their
external environment and a susceptibility to peer pressure- combine to
make youth less culpable twice over. These pressures were particularly
salient for Guadalupe, because his absent father and alcoholic mother
poisoned his home environment, while his peers exerted pressures within
the context of a gang. Long before Guadalupe became a prisoner in the
Washington Department of Corrections, he was trapped in an environment
he could not shape or escape. This environment profoundly affects the
calculus of culpability.

C. The Same Factors That Malte Youth Less Culpable than
Adults, Also Malw Them More Capable of Change.
Effective Life Sentences Fail to Recognize This Potential for
Rehabilitation.
"[I]ncorrigibility is inconsistent with youth." Graham, 130 S. Ct. at
2029 (internal citation omitted). Adolescence is a time of remarkable
change and transience, when youth are still struggling to form a basic
identity. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (noting that "[t]he personality traits of
juveniles are more transitory, less fixed" than those of adults). Youth
crime reflects this transient period and is one of the "qualities of youth"
itself, rather than a sign of an intractably bad character. !d. Although
violent crime peaks around 16 and 17 years, it "drop[ s] precipitously in
committing the offense alone."); Moffit, supra note 8, at 686-88 (finding a strong
correlation between a youth's propensity to commit a crime and peer delinquency).

10

young adulthood." 31 In fact, developmental psychiatrists have found that
the vast majority of youth offenders will stop committing crime once they
are adults, 32 and very few youth offenders develop intractable or long term
problems with criminality. 33 This capacity for change is a cmcial
distinction between youth offenders and adult offenders. "From a moral
standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with
those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor's character
deficiencies will be reformed." Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027-28 (quoting

Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
Youth characteristics arc so malleable that "[i]t is diflicult even for
expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose
crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immatmity, and the rare juvenile
offender whose crime rellects irreparable corruption." !d. at 2029
(quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573). If trained psychiatrists cannot predict
which youth offenders are incorrigible and which are capable of change,
than smely trial judges (and prosecutors) cannot do so either. 34 "The
reality that juveniles still stmggle to define their identity means it is less

31

32

Moffit, supra note 8, at 675.
Steinberg & Scott, supra note 5, at 1015.

!d.
In fact, vexed researchers have found that those youth offenders who change and those
who continue committing crimes exhibit identical behavior at the outset, making it

33

34

impossible to identify inconigible offenders. Edward Mulvey & Elizabeth Cauffman, The
Inherent Limits q( Predicting School Violence, 56 AM. PSYCI!OLOGIST 797, 799 (200 I).
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supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile
is evidence of[an] irretrievably depraved character." Roper, 543 U.S. at
570. Echoing its reasoning in Roper, Gmhammade clear that there is no
reliable way- either for a prosecutor or a sentencing judge- to determine
when a youth offender's crimes are the result of"irreparable cormption,"
and no reliable way to conclude that a youth offender ought to die in
prison. Sentencing Guadalupe to 92 years in prison, therefore, cannot rest
on the assumption that he is irredeemably depraved.
Additionally, because youth have such tremendous capacity for
change and rehabilitation, Roper and Graham emphasized that youth
offenders should not be given irreversible sentences. Life without parole
sentences "share some characteristics with death sentences that are shared
by no other sentences." Gmham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027. Like the death
penalty, a life without parole sentence "does not even purport to serve a
rehabilitative function." I!armelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1028, Ill
S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Additionally, like
the death penalty, this 92-year sentence is irreversible because the years
Guadalupe will serve can never be returned, and the 92-year term can only
end with death. 35 This sentence, like the death sentence, effectively

35

"The SWte does not execute the offender sentenced to life without parole, but the

sentences alters the offender's life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable. It deprives the
convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration." 130 S. Ct. at 2027.
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condemns Guadalupe to die in prison whether or not he demonstrates what
most youth offenders eventually demonstrate: a matured moral character
that warrants a second chance. In this way, a life without parole sentence
"deprives children of both any hope for return to society and any
opportunity for rehabilitation." 36 The remote possibility of gubernatorial
clemency does not change this calculus. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027 ("the
remote possibility of [executive clemency] does not mitigate the harshness
of the sentence").
Given that the vast majority of youth offenders do change, and that
judges cannot predict when they will not, the Gmhmn_Court opted for a
categorical mle against life without parole sentences for youth nonhomicide offenders. !d. at 2030 ("Categorical rules tend to be imperfect,
but one is necessary here."). Guadalupe Solis Diaz's effective life sentence
of92.5 years directly contradicts Graham's rationale.

II. Given That Youth At·e Legally and Scientifically Less Culpable
than Adults, this Court Should Declare that Effective Life
Sentences Must Provide Youth a Meaningful Opportunity to
Obtain Release.
A. Effective Life Sentences that Provide No Meaningful
Opportunity to Obtain Release Are No Different than Life
Without Parole. Therefore, Washington's Determinate
Sentencing Statute Is Unconstitutional As Applied to Youth
Non-Homicide Offenders.
36

Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment
to Comtitutional Disclosure, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. Ill, 162 (2007).
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The State argues that Guadalupe was not given a life sentence, but
rather a determinate sentence of I, Ill months, or 92.5 years. But this
labeling argument is illogical and formalistic, unless the State genuinely
believes that Guadalupe will live to be I 08 years old. A mechanistic
understanding of what constitutes a "life sentence" would render Graham
a nullity by allowing sentencing courts to get around Graham's holding by
simply labeling a sentence "determinate" rather than "life." Whether this
sentence is labeled "determinate" or "life" does not change the fact that
Guadalupe will die in prison, "even if he spends the next half ce1.1tnry
attempting to atone for his crimes and learn from his mistakes. The State
has denied [Guadalupe] any chance to later demonstrate that he is fit to
rejoin society based solely on a nonhomicide crime that he committed
while he was a child in the eyes of the law. This the Eighth Amendment
does.not permit." Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033? 7 To the extent that
Washington's Determinate Sentencing Law permits a juvenile convicted
37

Additionally, the U.S. Snpreme Court has recognized the particular severity of

sentences that deny the possibility of parole. For instance, in Rummel v. Estelle, the Court
rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to a life sentence because the defendant had the
possibility to obtain release through parole. 445 U.S. 263,280-81, 100 S. Ct. 1133,62
L.Ed.2d 382 (1980). The Court "could hardly ignore the possibility that he will not

actually be imprisoned for the rest of his life., Id. However, in contrast, the Court struck
down the determinate life sentence in Solem v. l!elm, concluding that it was "far more
severe than the life sentence we considered in Rummef' because the defendant in Solem
did not have the possibility for parole. 463 U.S. 277, 297, I 03 S. Ct. 300 I, 77 L.Ed.2d
637 (1983). Here, like the sentence in Solem, Guadalupe's sentence does not provide the
possibility of parole. This Court cannot ignore that Guadalupe will be imprisoned for the
rest {){his l[fe.
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of a non-homicide offense to be given an effective life sentence, it is
unconstitutional under Graham.
B. A "Meaningful Opportunity" fot· Release Means That a
Youth Offender He Given a Chance - Though Not a
Guarantee - fm· Release After He Has Set·ved a Term of
Years Equivalent to his Age When He Committed the
Underlying Offense.
A life sentence is "the second most severe penalty permitted by
law." Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027 (internal citation omitted). Because of
.

its severity, the Supreme Court has determined that youth offenders who
receive life sentences must be given a "meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." Id. at 2030.
However, the Court left it to the state courts "in the first instance, to
explore the means and mechanisms for compliance." Id. That instance has
arrived. In accordance with constitutional design and Graham's mandate,
"the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment" falls upon this Comt. Id.
at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 575). This Court must determine in
the exercise of its own independent judgment whether the punishment in
question violates the Constitution.
Structurally, the categorical rule articulated in Graham requires
drawing two lines: a front line that defines when a particular offender may
be given a life without parole sentence and a back line that provides a
"meaningful opportunity to obtain release." The Supreme Court drew the
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Jl"Ont line itself at 18 years of age, to objectively distinguish between
minors and adults. !d. ("['!']hose who were below that age when the
offense was committed may not be sentenced to life without parole for a
nonhomicide crime."). But Graham explicitly left it up to the state courts
to draw the back line- that is, when a meaningful opportunity for release
ought to occur. The front line drawn by the Supreme Court is meaningless
if, in the absence of a back line, youth offenders may be sentenced to 92
years, or eiTective life imprisonment, with no "meaningful opportunity to
obtain release." Ultimately, according to Graham, this Court must bring
to bear its own judgment to determine when a youth offender should be
given an opportunity for release based on maturity and rehabilitation. 38
This Court is now called upon to draw that line.
The same logic that compelled the Supreme Court to draw a
categorical front line at 18 years leads to the conclusion that a similarly
objective and age-based line ought to be drawn on the back. Given what
we now know about youth brain development and capacity for change, as
well as the Supreme Court's guidance that the opportunity be
"meaningfiil," Amici urge the Court to hold that youth offenders convicted

38

Two categorical rules are necessary because this case, like Graham, implicatcs a
pmticular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of offenders who have
committed a range of crimes.~~ 130 S. Ct. at 2022-23. That is, this case involves a life
equivalent sentence as it applies to a class of offenders- youth- who have committed a
range of "non-homicide'' offenses.
11
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of a non-homicide offense and sentenced to a term of years longer than
their age, must be given a meaningful opportunity to obtain release once
they have served a term of years eguivalent to their age at the time they
committed the underlying offense. Under this rule, a sixteen-year-old
would be given an opportunity- though not a guarantee- for release by
time he is 32 years old, if he has demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.
Tltis rule would in no way excuse a youth offender's crimes; it would
simply acknowledge their reduced culpability and provide a clear
framework by which to comply with Graham? 9
An age-proportional definition is appropriate for three reasons.
First, a life sentence is "especially harsh" for a youth offender who,
because of his age, will "serve more years and a greater percentage of his
life in prison than an adult offender." Graham, 130 S. Ct. at2028. "A 16year-old and a 75-year-old each sentenced to life without parole receive
the same punishment in name only." Id. "This reality cannot be ignored."

Id. Second, an age-based definition of"meaningful opportunity" would be
consistent with the Supreme Court's logic in Roper and Graham that the
younger an offender is, the less culpable he is. Because age has a positive
correlation with culpability, this mle would be the least arbitrary way to
comply with Graham. And finally, an age-proportional rule would
39

''A juvenile is not absolved of responsibility for his actions, but his transgression 'is not

as morally reprehensible as that of an adult."' 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (citation omitted).
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acknowledge the science underlying the Supreme Court's decision in

Graham: namely, that youth have a tremendous capacity for chailge and
maturation.
Simply redrawing the line to fifty-years or forty-years would not
constitute a "meaningful opportunity for release." Embodied in Graham's
"meaningful opportunity" requirement is the precept that youth offenders
be given an incentive to improve themselves in prison so that they might
look forward to the day when they can reenter society, rediscover their
humanity, and rebuild their lives:
Life in prison without the possibility of parole gives no
chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for
reconciliation with society, no hope. Maturity can lead to
that considered reflection which is the foundation .for
remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation. A young person who
knows that he or she has no chance to leave prison before
life's end has little incentive to become a responsible
individual.

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032." 0 A release after 30 or 40 years is hardly
meaningful, and would not provide a youth offender with any incentive to
improve himself, or look forward to the day when he would one day rejoin
society. Long sentences that keep youth in prison for decades after they
already have demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation defeat the logic
.Jo As the Nevada State Supreme Court observed, a sentence like this "means denial of
hope; it means that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it menas
that whatever the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the offender], he
will remain in prison for the rest of his days." Naovarath v. State, 105 Nev. 525,526,779
P.2d 944 (Nev. 1989).
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underlying Graham's categorical rule, rendering hollow the requirement
that youth be given a truly meaning/it! opportunity to obtain release.
This Court should not draw the line in a way that renders Gmham
meaningless.
CONCLUSION

"[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and
condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to intluence and
to psychological damage." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115, 102

S. Ct. 869, 71 L. Ed. 2d I (1982). Thirty years after Eddings, scientific
research conlinns that youth o!Jenders cannot be expected to think or
behave like adults. Recognizing these differences, the Supreme Court
articulated a categorical rule that youth offenders convicted of nonhomicide offenses cannot receive life sentences without a meaningful
opportunity for release.
Guadalupe's crime was serious, but "it does not follow that he
would be a risk to society for the rest of his life." Gmham, 130 S. Ct. at
2029. The Eighth Amendment does not guarantee that a youth nonhomicide offender will not spend his life behind bars, but it does forbid
statutory schemes that make that judgment at the outset, before the youth
is given a chance to redeem himself. To the extent that Washington's
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determinate sentencing statute permits life-equivalent sentences for youth
non-homicide offenders, it is unconstitutional under Graham.
An age-proportional line is necessary to prevent life equivalent
sentences for youth non-homicide offenders who are not sufficiently
culpable and whose capacity for change counsels against life
imprisonment. This Court should VACATE the sentence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of December 20 II.
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